

Introduction to Multi-Agent Programming

12. Voting

Preferences, Voting Protocols, Borda Protocol, Arrow's Impossibility Result

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Voting

Introduction

- In open systems agents have their *individual preferences*
- Agreements can be reached by *voting*
 - Applicable for both *benevolent* and *self-interested* agents
- A *voting system* derives a social preference from each individual preference
- How to find a fair solution? What means a *fair solution*?
- One way to approach the *fairness problem* is to require:
 - If one agent prefers A to B and another one prefers B to A then their votes should cancel each other out
 - If one agent's preferences are A,B,C and another one's are B,C,A and a third one prefers C,A,B then their votes should cancel out

Voting


Definition

- Given a set of agents A and a set of outcomes O , each agent $I \in A$ has a strict, asymmetric, and transitive preference relation \succ_i on O
- A **voting system** derives a social preference \succ_* from all agents' individual preferences $(\succ_1, \dots, \succ_{|A|})$
- Desired properties of a voting system are:
 1. \succ_* exists for all possible inputs \succ_i
 2. \succ_* should be **defined** for every pair $o, o' \in O$
 3. \succ_* should be **asymmetric** and **transitive** over O
 4. The outcome should be **Pareto efficient**: if $\forall i \in A, o \succ_i o'$ then $o \succ_* o'$, e.g., if all agents prefer beer over milk then \succ_* should also prefer beer over milk
 5. The scheme should be **independent** of irrelevant alternatives, i.e. when adding another alternative the ranking should be same
 6. No **dictatorship**: if $o \succ_i o'$ implies $o \succ_* o'$ for all preferences of the other agents


Voting

Example

15 mathematicians are planning to **throw a party**. They must first decide **which beverage** the department will serve at this party. There are three choices available to them: **beer**, **wine**, and **milk**.



?



6 x Milk \succ Wine \succ Beer

5 x Beer \succ Wine \succ Milk

4 x Wine \succ Beer \succ Milk

Voting

Plurality protocol


- Majority voting protocol where **alternatives** are compared simultaneously
- In the example:
 - Each one votes for her/his **favorite** drink
 - The drink with the most votes is the **winner**
 - Beer would get 5 votes, wine 4, and milk 6 → **Milk** wins!
 - **Problems:**
 - There are 8 agents that prefer beer over milk and wine over milk, but only 6 that have the **opposite** preferences, and yet milk wins?
 - Irrelevant alternatives can lead to different results

Voting

Binary Voting

- Alternatives are voted on **pairwise**, the winner stays to challenge further alternatives while the loser is eliminated
- For example:
 - beer & wine: wine wins, wine & milk: **wine** wins
- **Problems:**
 - Irrelevant alternatives can lead to different results
 - The order of the considered pairings can totally change the outcome. For example:

35% of agents have preferences $a \succ d \succ b \succ c$
 33% of agents have preferences $a \succ c \succ d \succ b$
 32% of agents have preferences $b \succ a \succ c \succ d$



Voting

Borda Protocol

- Takes into account all agents' knowledge equally
- Let $|O|$ denote the number of alternatives
- Assigns $|O|$ points to an alternative whenever it is highest in some agent's preference, assigns $|O-1|$ whenever it is second, ...
- Counts are summed across voters, alternative with highest count becomes the social choice
- In the example:
 - Milk: $6*3 + 5*1 + 4*1 = 27$
 - Wine: $6*2 + 5*2 + 4*3 = 34$
 - Beer: $6*1 + 5*3 + 4*2 = 29$
 - Wine wins!

Voting

Arrow's impossibility Theorem

- There is no voting mechanism that satisfies all six conditions (Arrow, 1951)
 - For example, also in the Borda protocol, irrelevant alternatives can lead to paradox results (violating (5)):

Agent	Preferences
1	$a \succ b \succ c \succ d$
2	$b \succ c \succ d \succ a$
3	$c \succ d \succ a \succ b$
4	$a \succ b \succ c \succ d$
5	$b \succ c \succ d \succ a$
6	$c \succ d \succ a \succ b$
7	$a \succ b \succ c \succ d$
Borda count	c wins with 20, b has 19, a has 18, d loses with 13
Borda count with d removed	a wins with 15, b has 14, c loses with 13

Winner turns loser and loser turns winner paradox in the Borda protocol

Summary

- Voting methods have to be implemented carefully with respect to the desired outcome
- In practice, the plurality protocol is often used in multi-agent systems
- However, the Borda protocol should be preferred as it can effectively aggregate multiple disparate opinions