

Auditing Workflow Executions against Dataflow Policies

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Abstract. This paper presents IFAudit, an approach for the audit of dataflow policies in workflow models. IFAudit encompasses three steps. First, propagation graphs are generated from workflows' log data. They represent the explicit information flows caused, e.g., by data access and message-passing, that have occurred during the execution of the workflow. Second, dataflow policies expressing security and compliance requirements are formalized in a system-independent manner as a binary relation on the workflow principals. Third, an audit algorithm analyzes the propagation graphs against the policies and delivers evidence with regard to whether the workflow complies with them. Besides presenting the corresponding algorithms, the paper discusses possible extensions to address more general types of information flows.

Keywords: Dataflow, audit, policy, workflow and business process.

1 Introduction

With workflows becoming omnipresent in the realization of automated business processes, their security and dependability aspects have been gaining on momentum. While a plethora of approaches exists which address the construction of workflows that meet functional and non-functional requirements “by design” [5,15,18], there is no work tackling a-posteriori analysis of workflow logs for the automated detection of policy violations [16]. In consequence, audits are manual and, thereby, time-intensive, costly and error-prone [4,7].

This paper presents IFAudit, a novel approach for the audit of workflow models against dataflow policies. The key idea of IFAudit is the use log files as a basis for the detection of dataflow violations. Given a log file containing the execution traces of a workflow, IFAudit reconstructs a set of *propagation graphs* that formalize the flow of information between the subjects in the workflow. Besides representing models of the execution used for auditing, propagation graphs are also useful as a graphic cue to demonstrate the flow of information and possible attacks.

Within the context of IFAudit, dataflow policies are formalized as constraints on the possible and undesirable relations among system subjects, independently

Instance ID	Timestamp	Activity Name	Originator	Input	Output
1	2009-04-23 08:08:00	Retrieve_Data	Subject1	Msg1 (EXT)	File1
1	2009-04-23 08:09:00	Retrieve_Data	Subject1	Msg2 (EXT)	File2
1	2009-04-23 08:12:00	Create_Report	User_Accounting	File1, File2	Report1
1	2009-04-23 08:12:00	Publish_Report	User_IR	Report1	Public_Report09

Fig. 1. An exemplary workflow log file.

from the concrete implementation. This formalization is stronger than access control policies, such as XACML and EPAL, because it captures information propagation throughout the system (*end-to-end*) rather than access at certain access points and channels.

With a set of models and the corresponding policies at hand, IFAudit encompasses algorithms for auditing the models and generating evidence with regard to whether the dataflow policies are complied with. Technically, this means traversing the propagation graphs and detecting either unallowed or missing transitions prescribed by the policies.

The contributions of this paper are the following:

- A meta-language for the expression of dataflow and, more generally, information flow requirements (Section 3).
- An algorithm to generate propagation graphs from log files (Section 4).
- An audit algorithm for the automated analysis of propagation graphs against policies and the generation of evidence of adherence (Section 4).

The overall goal of IFAudit is to design methods for the reconstruction of workflow models and their properties from execution traces, and to determine whether these models comply with security policies. While this paper focuses on dataflow properties and, hence, on a subset of information flow properties, preliminary results show that the approach can be generalized for other information flow policies, such as Chinese-Wall and Biba [6], whose instantiations are relevant in enterprise settings, and *implicit* information flow, through covert channels [13].

2 Workflows and Log Data

Workflows formally describe business processes as structured sequences of activities that must be performed in order to reach a certain business goal. The activities in a workflow can be a mixture of automated tasks (i.e. programs/services)




Fig. 2. Exemplary flow policies.

and human interaction (e.g. the creation of documents). All the different formalisms that are used for workflow specification (such as BPEL, BPMN, Event-driven Process Chains) share a “core” of basic control constructs, including parallelism, conditionals and synchronization, making them in essence equally powerful (Turing-complete). The execution of a workflow is coordinated by an execution engine which, e.g., triggers activities, synchronizes their interaction and communication, and writes log data. The latter builds the basis for the audits considered in this paper.

An excerpt of a log file with the required attributes is depicted in

Log files of workflow systems are structured as sequences of entries, as depicted in Fig. 1. An entry comprises attributes of the activity, such as the particular workflow instance, the timestamp, and the data items that were processed. The IFAudit system uses the MXML log format, that originated as a log format for process mining [20]. We assume that a log file has the following properties:

- An entry can be attributed to an activity and to a workflow instance.
- An entry contains the originator (i.e. the subject on which behalf the corresponding activity was performed) and the data items that were read (input) and written (output) by the activity.
- The events are chronologically ordered by a timestamp.
- The log data is authentic, i.e. it has not been tampered with. Mechanisms to ensure authenticity exist [2].

Formally, $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{W}}$ denotes the log file for a workflow \mathcal{W} . The execution of \mathcal{W} produces a log file $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{W}}$ with the aforementioned properties. $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{W}}$ is in \mathcal{A}^* , where \mathcal{A} is the universe of all log file entries. $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{W}}$ can be partitioned into a set $\{i_0^{\mathcal{W}}, i_1^{\mathcal{W}}, \dots, i_n^{\mathcal{W}}\}$ where $i_i^{\mathcal{W}}$ denotes the trace (ordered sequence of log entries) for the i^{th} execution of \mathcal{W} ($0 \leq i \leq n$). An entry a has the attributes *orig* (the originator), *input* (the set of input data items) and *output* (the set of output data items). The attributes of an entry are projected with a dot, e.g. $a.\text{orig}$ for the originator.

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<Policy>      ::= <Rule> | <Rule>, <Policy>
<Rule>       ::= <Restriction>  $\Rightarrow$  <Exception>
<Restriction> ::= true | <FlowRel>
<Exception>  ::= false | <FR-DNF>
<FR-DNF>    ::= (<ConClause>) | (<ConClause>)  $\vee$  <FR-DNF>
<ConClause> ::= <FlowRel> | <FlowRel>  $\wedge$  <ConClause>
<FlowRel>   ::= <Domain> $\rightsquigarrow$ <Domain>
<Domain>    ::=  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ 

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Fig. 3. BNF grammar of the policy language.

For conciseness' sake, below the term *activity* is also used to denote the *log entry* of an activity.

3 Policies

An information flow policy $\mathcal{P} = \{r_1, \dots, r_n\}$ is a set of rules that specify which groups of principals in a system may or may not exchange information. The principals are the originators (subjects) that appear in a log file $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{W}}$, denoted as $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{W}} = \bigcup_{a \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{W}}} a.orig$.

Principals are assigned security classifications from a set \mathcal{D} of security domains. A security domain denotes the rights and privileges of principals to obtain or manipulate information. The actual information flow policy specifies among which security domains information may or must not be exchanged, respectively. The function $sc : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}$ assigns principals to security domains.

Fig. 2(a) shows an example of a multi-level-security policy with three domains that are arranged according to a lattice $Secret \succ Confidential \succ Public$. A crossed arrow indicates that there must not flow information. Information may flow only upwards this lattice and thus cannot leak to principals with a lower clearance.

However, it is insufficient to state that some information may or may not flow from one principal to another. Rather, the exact path that some information has to take through the organization must be prescribed, for instance, to ensure that financial statements are cleared by the revision department before being published to investors. A corresponding information flow policy is depicted in Fig. 2(b): information coming from the *Accounting* domain must not flow directly to the *IR* department, but has to pass through *Revision*.

3.1 Syntax

A policy rule has the form $Restriction \Rightarrow Exception$. *Restriction* is a flow relation $source \rightsquigarrow target$, which specifies that information must not flow from domain *source* to domain *target* ($source, target \in \mathcal{D}$). *Exception* is a logical combination of flow relations in disjunctive normal form which defines legitimate flows that might contradict *Restriction* (as in the example in Fig. 2(b)). Fig. 3 gives the grammar for these policies in Backus-Naur-Form (BNF).

Using this grammar, the policies in Fig. 2 have the form




Fig. 4. Outline of the IFAudit system.

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Secret $\rightsquigarrow$ Confidential  $\Rightarrow$  false,
Confidential $\rightsquigarrow$ Public  $\Rightarrow$  false,
Secret $\rightsquigarrow$ Public  $\Rightarrow$  false

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and

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Accounting $\rightsquigarrow$ IR  $\Rightarrow$ 
(Accounting $\rightsquigarrow$ Revision  $\wedge$  Revision $\rightsquigarrow$ IR).

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This rule format has been integrated in the ExpPDT policy language to build a fully-fledged language for information flow policies. ExpPDT is an expressive policy language designed for formalizing privacy and compliance policies [12]. An ExpPDT policy and the target system share a common ontology, which maps the policy entities to those of the system. Ontologies are expressed in OWL-DL, which is the maximum subset of the Web Ontology Language (OWL) that is computationally complete and decidable.

3.2 Semantics

Besides the extensional specification of flow relations, which denote whether data may flow between domains, an information flow policy defines which patterns of system actions constitute information transmission. We refer to this part of the policy as *flow semantics*.

The IFAudit system currently supports the specification and verification of dataflow requirements, i.e. constraints on the explicit information flow. Here, the flow semantics is trace-based and fairly straightforward: there is an dataflow from domain d_1 to domain d_2 , if, and only if, there is a data item which has been modified by an activity from d_1 and is subsequently read by an activity from d_2 . Formally:

$$\begin{aligned}
\forall d_1, d_2 \in \mathcal{D} : d_1 \rightsquigarrow d_2 \Leftrightarrow & \\
& \exists (a_1, a_2 \in \mathcal{A}), \exists (p_1, p_2 \in \mathcal{S}) : \\
& (a_1.\text{orig} = p_1) \wedge (a_2.\text{orig} = p_2) \wedge \\
& (sc(p_1) = d_1) \wedge (sc(p_2) = d_2) \wedge \\
& ((d_1.\text{out} \cap d_2.\text{in}) \neq \{\}) \wedge (a_1 < a_2),
\end{aligned}$$

where $<$ is the temporal ordering according to the timestamp. This approach is similar to the tainting mode in the Perl programming language. It is sufficiently expressive to capture violations, such as failure to “clear” information or illicit propagation of some data item. For a more fine-grained analysis and to capture other kinds of information flows, more sophisticated semantics and analysis algorithms are needed and are subject of future work (see Section 6).

4 Audit Algorithm

The IFAudit system analyzes dataflow at workflow level, i.e. the information transfer that occurs among the activities. Activities are regarded as black boxes of whose internal operation is not necessarily visible, but only their I/O. At this level of abstraction, IFAudit allows to check whether a workflow instance has exhibited illicit information flows with regard to a policy, e.g. whether some datum was possibly read by a non-authorized party or whether a document has been double-checked before being published (four-eye rule).

The structure of IFAudit is outlined in Fig. 4. In the first phase of the audit process, the log entries are mapped into a graph-based representation. For each workflow instance, a *propagation graph* (PG) is created to denote the dataflows between the involved subjects that have occurred in the corresponding instance. The PGs are subsequently analyzed for illicit information flows according to the given policy. In the case of policy violations, the IFAudit system issues evidence specifying the dataflow that caused the violation.

The PG for a trace $i_n^{\mathcal{W}} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{W}}$ is denoted $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$. It is defined as a graph (V, E) , where $V = \{a \in \mathcal{A} \mid a \in i_n^{\mathcal{W}}\}$ is a set of activities (representing the graph’s vertices), and $E = \{(a, b) \in (\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{A}) \mid a < b \wedge a.\text{output} \cap b.\text{input} \neq \{\}\}$ is an asymmetric relation representing the graph’s (directed) edges. An edge (a, b) in a PG indicates that there was a dataflow from activity a to activity b .

Constructing Propagation Graphs Fig. 5 shows the pseudo-code for the CONSTRUCT-procedure, which constructs the propagation graph $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ for a trace $i_n^{\mathcal{W}}$. During the construction process, the procedure maintains a mapping MOD that maps a data item to the activity that last modified it. Starting with the initial activity, every activity from $i_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ is added as a vertex to $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$. It is checked whether an input datum of the activity that is currently under consideration has been modified by previous activities. This is done by comparing the

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CONSTRUCT( $i_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ ):
MOD := {};
for each ( $a$  in  $i_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ ) do
  Add  $a$  as a vertex to  $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ ;
  for each ( $d$  in ( $a.input \cap \text{DOM}(\text{MOD})$ )) do
    Add edge ( $\text{MOD}(d), a$ ) to  $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ ;
  for each ( $o$  in  $a.output$ ) do
    MOD := MOD  $\cup$   $o \rightarrow a$ ;

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Fig. 5. Pseudo-code for the CONSTRUCT-procedure.

activities’ *input*-attributes with the domain $\text{DOM}(\text{MOD})$ of mapping MOD. If a data item d is found, an edge from the activity that last modified d to the current activity is inserted into $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$. Afterwards, the mapping for each data item that is modified by the current activity is updated or added to MOD. The result of the CONSTRUCT procedure is a propagation graph $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ which contains every activity in $i_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ as a vertex. Not every activity in $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ can necessarily be reached from the initial activity, if there has not been a corresponding dataflow. Therefore, $PG_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ might have multiple nodes with an indegree of zero (i.e. there are no inbound dataflows). All dataflows originating from these nodes have to be checked separately (see below).

The CONSTRUCT procedure is applied consecutively to every trace $i_n^{\mathcal{W}}$ from a logfile $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{W}}$. If a propagation graph is identical to another that has been generated before, it is discarded in order to minimize the effort of the audit algorithm.¹

Audit To check whether a workflow instance adheres to a given policy, its PG is traversed in a depth-first fashion. The starting points for the traversal are those activities with no incoming dataflow (nodes with an indegree of zero). During traversal, it is checked whether an activity marks the starting point of an illicit information flow (i.e. if it is assigned a security domain that is the source of a rule’s restriction). Such rules are kept in a set of “open” rules and checked whether they are “closed” (i.e. violated) by a subsequent activity. An activity closes a rule, if its assigned security class corresponds to the end point of that rule’s restriction, and if the rule’s *exception*-clause evaluates to *false*. Fig. 6 shows the pseudo-code for the procedures CHECK and VISIT. The CHECK procedure is the main procedure which initializes the data structures and triggers the traversals. The VISIT procedure checks whether an activity closes or opens a rule before recursively applying itself to each of the activity’s successors. The field *OpenRules* contains the set of rules that have been opened by one or many activities residing above the current activity in the PG.

The mapping SRC maps each rule from *OpenRules* to the set of activities that have opened that rule. At the beginning, VISIT checks whether the current activity u closes any rules and reports a violation along with corresponding

¹ Because a PG abstracts from the concrete value of a transferred datum, log traces with the same sequence of activities (and identical I/O) will result in identical PGs. In consequence, the audit algorithm will identical results.

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CHECK( $PG_n^W, \mathcal{P}$ ):
for each (Vertex  $a$  in  $PG_n^W$  with  $\text{INDEGREE}(a) = 0$ ) do
   $OpenRules := \{\}$ ;
  for each (Rule  $r \in \mathcal{P}$ ) do
     $SRC(r) := \{\}$ ;
  VISIT( $a$ );

VISIT( $u$ ):
for each (Rule  $r \in OpenRules$  that is closed by  $u$ ) do
  Report violation of  $r$  through flow(s) from  $SRC(r)$  to  $u$ ;
for each (Rule  $r \in \mathcal{P}$  that is opened by  $u$ ) do
   $OpenRules := OpenRules \cup r$ ;
   $SRC(r) = SRC(r) \cup u$ ;
Mark  $u$  as visited;
 $Successors :=$  Direct successors of  $u$ ;
Sort  $Successors$  in ascending order;
for each ( $v$  in  $Successors$ ) do
  if ( $v$  is not marked as visited) then
    VISIT( $v$ );
for each (Rule  $r \in \mathcal{P}$  that is opened by  $u$ ) do
   $SRC(r) = SRC(r) \setminus u$ ;
  if ( $SRC(r) = \{\}$ ) then
     $OpenRules := OpenRules \setminus r$ ;

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Fig. 6. Pseudo-code for the CHECK and VISIT procedures.

evidence (see below). Afterwards, *OpenRules* and SRC are updated with the rules that are opened by u itself. The successors of u are subsequently processed according to their chronological appearance in the log file (otherwise, if some activity a_2 would be visited before a_1 , and $a_1 < a_2$, a dataflow from a_1 to a_2 might be missed). Before VISIT finishes the processing of activity u and returns to its predecessor in the PG, SRC and *OpenRules* are adjusted: for every rule r that is opened by u , u is removed from the set SRC(r). If u is the only activity that currently opens r , r is removed from the set of open rules.

The evidence that is created when a violation occurs contains the corresponding rule and a subgraph from the PG in which the violation was detected. This subgraph denotes the dataflow that caused the violation and thus serves as a counterexample for the workflow's adherence to the corresponding rule. Fig. 7 depicts an example of a PG that violates the policy rule from Fig. 2(b), along with the corresponding evidence generated by the audit algorithm.

5 Related Work

A number of approaches to the a-posteriori checking of security policies have been proposed that are related to IFAudit. The ExaMINA system allows the formalization and checking of privacy policies [1]. ExaMINA formulates policies in terms of access rules that can be augmented with conditions and obligations (e.g. requiring the deletion of a datum after a certain period). APPLE is geared towards controlling the use and propagation of documents in distributed environments [9]. It consists of a logical framework, which uses logs to verify whether actions were authorized, and a trust management system which ensures that




Fig. 7. Generation of evidence.

data items are only provided to users on an auditable system. Cedequist et al. present a policy language that allows the specification of conditions, obligations and the refinement of policies [8]. The associated proof checking system can verify whether data that is distributed in a decentralized architecture has been used according to a usage policy that is passed along with the data. IFAudit differs from these approaches as it uses an explicit notion of information flow, which allows to track information over several data items without having to specify the precise actions that may or must not be performed by the subjects.

Process mining is a discipline from business process management which addresses the reconstruction of workflow models from log data [19]. Process mining is driven by organizational problems and delivers models of a workflow's functionality which are used, for instance, to check the structural conformance of the implemented workflow with the intended business process or to identify performance bottlenecks. In contrast to the propagation graphs used by IFAudit, reconstructed workflow models do not account for information flows. Propagation graphs as they are used in this paper build on a similar concept proposed in [14].

A plethora of research exists on the prevention of illicit information flows in programs through static or dynamic analyses (for an overview see [17]). Its a-posteriori detection has previously been addressed by the authors [3,21]. A hybrid approach is proposed by Hammer et al. which combine static program analysis with log information of the corresponding program in order to increase the precision of the analysis [10].

6 Conclusion and Ongoing Work

In its current state, IFAudit is restricted to checking dataflow policies constraining the path of unspecified data items. Therefore, IFAudit is capable of expressing and checking elementary security requirements (in essence those depicted in

the example in Fig. 2). However, as it does not distinguish between data items, more fine-grained security requirements are currently not supported. A further limitation regards the detection of implicit information flows, i.e. information transmission through channels that are not intended for that purpose [13]. These and other issues are currently addressed in the realm of a more comprehensive research project on secure workflows.

We currently evaluate the efficiency of IFAudit with a proof-of-concept implementation. For this purpose, a simulation environment was built, which executes workflows and writes the corresponding log files. Workflow models are taken from a collection of industrial business processes and parametrized to exhibit illicit dataflows with respect to policies that were derived from common compliance frameworks (such as Hipaa [11]).

Ongoing work IFAudit is part of an ongoing project on the forensic generation of formal security certificates for workflows. Central to the project is a formal meta-model for workflows which subsumes the propagation graphs used in this paper and allows to express both dataflows and implicit information flows. Corresponding models are generated either from static workflow descriptions (for instance in BPEL or BPMN) which are complemented with runtime information from log traces, or solely from log data, using reconstruction algorithms. For the analysis of the workflow model, we aim to employ existing techniques for information flow analysis which are adapted correspondingly. The issued certificates shall formally circumscribe the security guarantees provided by the workflow.

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